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Jurek v. Texas' ended the death penalty prosecution hiatus in Texas, an
interruption that stemmed from the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Furman v. Georgia.2 Vigorous action by district attorneys across
the state resulted in 117 persons residing on "death row" by December
1979.3 Texas accounted for almost one-fifth of the persons sentenced to
death in the United States at that time.4
A. Indictment
Because of the severity of the crime alleged and the punishment in-
flicted, indictments for capital murder are closely scrutinized by bar and
bench. Under section 19.03(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, intentional
murder committed during the course of a robbery allows the state to indict
for capital murder rather than murder,5 and the court of criminal appeals
does not require that the indictment allege the elements of the underlying
robbery offense. 6 If the murder is committed during a conspiracy to com-
mit robbery, however, the requisites of the capital murder statutes are not
met. Conspiracy to rob, as contrasted with actual or attempted robbery,
does not give rise to capital murder. In English v. State7 the jury charge
included a charge both on robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.
The defendant contended that the instruction wrongfully allowed a capital
murder conviction based on the conspiracy. The court of criminal appeals
disagreed and upheld the jury charge, concluding that the "conspiracy"
language referred to the parties statute, section 7.02(b),8 and not to the
substantive offense of conspiracy.9 Thus, because the jury had relied on
the robbery charge, rather than the conspiracy charge, to elevate the of-
fense, the court held that the capital murder conviction was proper.' 0
* B.A., California State University; J.D., University of Texas. Adjunct Professor of
Law, St. Mary's University.
1. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. See Dix, Constitutional Validity of the Texas Capital Murder Scheme: A Continuing
Question, 43 TEX. B.J. 627, 627 (1980).
4. Id.
5. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
6. See Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
7. 592 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
8. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (Vernon 1974).
9. 592 S.W.2d at 954-55.
10. Id. at 956.
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In Quinones v. State" the court considered the propriety of a capital
murder indictment that charged two underlying offenses. The defendant
was accused of committing and attempting to commit kidnapping and rob-
bery while intentionally causing the death of another. Such a charge is not
"duplicitous," according to the Quinones court. ' 2 Apparently, if one trans-
action is involved in the intentional murder, more than one underlying
felony may be charged so long as each is an assault-type offense such as
rape, robbery, or kidnapping. In any event, the indictment must recite the
name of the victim. If it does not, the overruling of a timely motion to
quash a capital murder indictment constitutes reversible error. 13
B. Juries and Instructions
Qualifying an impartial jury is one part of the procedure in death pen-
alty cases. Prosecutors have invoked section 12.3 1(b) of the Penal Code 14
to disqualify members of the panel who would refuse to impose a death
sentence. Defense attorneys, however, have noticed the fact that section
12.31(b) excludes veniremen for reasons beyond those set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois,15 and have based
appeals upon that apparent conflict.' 6 In Adams v. Texas' 7 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the two rules may coexist, emphasizing,
however, that courts may not use section 12.31(b) to exclude jurors on
broader grounds than Witherspoon allows.18 The two are not independent
bases for disqualification; thus, section 12.31 (b) may be used as part of the
Texas death penalty procedure, albeit cautiously. Following the Adams
decision, the court of criminal appeals has begun to reverse cases for Ad-
ams error. 19
Once a Texas jury has rendered a guilty verdict in a capital murder case,
it enters into a separate punishment proceeding. During this second phase
of the trial, jurors consider three questions about the defendant, the first
11. 592 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
12. Id. at 944.
13. Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943, 946-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); accord, Brasfield v.
State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (kidnap victim not named); King v. State,
594 S.W.2d 425, 426-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (rape victim not named).
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974) provides:
Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or
death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall
be disqualified. . . unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of
death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of
fact.
15. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Witherspoon rule is that a venireman can be struck for
cause only when he is irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the
death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of
the proceedings. Id. at 522 n.21.
16. See generally Butts, Criminal Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 493,
504-05 (1980).
17. 100 S. Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1980).
18. Id. at 2528, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 592.
19. See, e.g., Hartfield v. State, No. 59,343 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1980); Evans v.
State, No. 60,016 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 1980).
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being whether he deliberately killed the victim. 20 An affirmative answer to
all inquiries gives rise to the death penalty. The term "deliberately" often
proves to be perplexing when defendants ask the court to define it for the
jury. The strongly worded dissent in Esquivel v. State,21 a capital convic-
tion that was affirmed by the court of criminal appeals, noted that the
court has not specifically determined whether the charge properly may al-
low the jury to consider mitigating circumstances in its consideration of the
first special issue of article 37.071.22 The dissent contended that such an
instruction would be proper so that jurors might understand that the term
"deliberately" means more than intentionally or knowingly, the culpable
mental states defined in the charge at the guilty phase. 23
The second question asked during the punishment phase is whether a
probability exists that the defendant will commit other criminal acts of
violence. 24 In Barefoot v. State,25 however, the court held that the trial
court did not err by refusing to define "probability" in its punishment
phase jury charge.26 Moreover, in Milton v. State27 the court ruled that the
trial court has discretion to limit the defense's voir dire of potential jurors'
understanding of the meaning of the words of article 37.071, among them
"deliberately," "probability," and "criminal acts of violence." '28
The third question asked during the punishment phase is inquired into
only if it is raised by the evidence. It asks whether the defendant's conduct
was an unreasonable response to the provocation, if any, by the de-
ceased.29 Although a defendant accused of robbery has no right of self-
defense against a manager of the property who fires a gun at the defend-
ant, he does have an imperfect self-defense claim that entitles him to sub-
mission of the provocation issue of article 37.071. Failure to submit this
third issue to the jury resulted in reversible error in Evans v. State.30
20. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides that
upon finding the defendant guilty of a capital offense, the court must conduct a separate
sentencing proceeding. After the presentation of evidence, the court must submit these is-
sues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Id. art. 37.071(b).
21. 595 S.W.2d 516, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (Clinton, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 530; cf. Starvaggi v. State, 593 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (instruction
on temporary insanity based on intoxication adequately protected accused's rights; refusal to
instruct jury to consider exculpatory excerpts from confession was proper).
23. 595 S.W.2d at 530.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
26. Id. at 887.
27. 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
28. Id. at 826; see note 20 supra.
29. See note 20 supra.
30. 601 S.W.2d 943, 946-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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C. Evidence
Article 37.071 gives great discretion to the trial judge in admitting evi-
dence during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. 31 Following
its earlier decisions, the court of criminal appeals has extended to the trial
judge much leeway in his determination of relevancy. 32 Evidence of an
extraneous offense is admissible at the capital punishment phase, even
before a final conviction on that offense has been secured. 33
The rule of evidence that excludes hearsay during the guilt stage of a
capital trial also is applicable in the punishment phase. In Rumbaugh v.
State34 the state introduced tape recordings over the objection of the de-
fendant. The reviewing court determined that a violation of the hearsay
rule had occurred and reversed the case.35
Once a jury convicts a defendant of capital murder, the punishment
hearing can have one of three possible outcomes: (1) a death sentence; (2)
a life sentence; or (3) a hung jury. When a life sentence is imposed, any
error in admitting or excluding evidence at the punishment phase is
deemed harmless. The court so concluded in Phelps v. State,36 and went
on to rule that Witherspoon is inapplicable when the jury assesses life im-
prisonment and no evidence is shown that the selection process produced a
panel that was necessarily "prosecution prone. ' 37
Insufficiency of evidence in the punishment phase will prevent the state
from seeking the death penalty again in the same case. The court of crimi-
nal appeals reached this conclusion in Braofeld v. State.38 In examining
the record, the court found that the circumstantial evidence introduced at
trial was insufficient to support an affirmative answer to the second issue of
article 37.071.39 Thus, in future cases, the safe procedure for the state will
be to seek a new indictment for murder, not capital murder, once such a
finding is made by the appellate court. In Brafield, however, the court
remarked that "under the present indictment the offense is still capital
murder . . . . [W]e are permitted the assumption that the case will be
retried on an amended indictment." 40 This statement indicates that the
court saw no resultant problem in a trial based upon a valid indictment for
capital murder, although the state is precluded from seeking the death
penalty.
31. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
32. See, e.g., Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Davis v. State,
597 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980); McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Demouchette v. State,
591 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979).
33. See Brooks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 312, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
34. 589 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
35. Id. at 417.
36. 594 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
37. Id.
38. 600 S.W.2d 288, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
39. Id. at 294; see note 20 supra.
40. 600 S.W.2d at 295.
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Apart from insufficiency of the evidence at the punishment phase as to
one of the article 37.071 issues, another situation that may bar the state
from seeking the death penalty in a retrial may be predicted: when the
first jury answers one of the three article 37.071 questions "No." Differing
from the insufficiency problem, this situation may be characterized as col-
lateral estoppel in that a jury already has decided an ultimate issue. The
court's answer to this precise question will have far-reaching effects on
some of Texas's many death penalty cases.
II. OTHER HOMICIDES
A. Murder
Although the defendant is charged in a one-count indictment with capi-
tal murder, the trial court properly may accept a plea of guilty to the lesser
included offense of murder without impaneling a jury. The en banc deci-
sion in Exparte McClelland4' settled the question whether reindictment is
necessary after the state and the defense have negotiated a plea. Petitioner
McClelland relied upon the "category of cases" theory espoused in Ex
parte Dowden42 and Batten v. State .43 In those cases the criminal appeals
court held that all of the requirements of the capital murder statutes must
be followed, including a jury trial and a specified number of peremptory
jury strikes.44 Further, the court held that the state could not waive the
death penalty. 45 In McClelland the court emphasized that these strictures
are not binding when the defendant enters a plea to murder, a lesser in-
cluded offense. 46 Reindictment is not required.
Fundamental error occurs when the jury charge enlarges upon the the-
ory alleged in the indictment. The indictment in Scott v. State47 was based
upon section 19.02(a)(1) of the murder statutes.48 It stated in part that the
defendant "did then and there unlawfully knowingly and intentionally
cause the death of an individual. . . by shooting him with a gun."' 49 The
jury charge, however, provided that in addition to a conviction under that
section, the jury might convict the defendant under section 19.02(a)(2). 50
The court cited Cumbie v. State,5' concerning fundamental errors in jury
41. 588 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
42. 580 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
43. 533 S.W.2d 788, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
44. 580 S.W.2d at 366; 533 S.W.2d at 793.
45. 580 S.W.2d at 366; 533 S.W.2d at 793.
46. 588 S.W.2d at 959.
47. 593 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
48. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) provides that a person com-
mits an offense if he "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual."
49. 593 S.W.2d at 724.
50. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) provides that a person com-
mits an offense if he "intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual."
51. 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); accord, Young v. State, 594 S.W.2d 428
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Bentacur v. State, 593 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Moring
v. State, 591 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Stewart v. State, 591 S.W.2d 537 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); cf. Trostle v. State, 588 S.W.2d 925, 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (omission
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charges, and reversed the conviction.52
Reversible error at the penalty phase of a murder trial results in a retrial
of the entire case when a jury assesses the punishment.53 The court is
without authority to direct a new hearing before a different jury on the
issue of punishment alone.54 Texas lawyers predict that an imminent
amendment to article 37.07 will change this procedure.
Insufficiency of the evidence in the first trial that resulted in a conviction
for murder can cause a reversal of the second conviction and the defend-
ant's release on a writ of habeas corpus.5 5 The court of criminal appeals
will grant retroactive relief when the original conviction is reversed on in-
sufficiency of the evidence.5 6 In two cases the court of criminal appeals
relied upon Burks v. United States57 and Greene v. Massey5" in holding
that when the evidence upon review is found to be legally insufficient to
sustain a guilty verdict, the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial.59
In Nixon v. State60 the court construed section 19.06, an evidentiary rule
in criminal cases. 61 The trial judge had refused to allow the defense to
question the accused regarding conversations with the deceased just before
he killed her. A hearsay objection by the state was sustained. Holding
that the statute permitted testimony as to all relevant facts and circum-
stances surrounding the killing, the court reversed the conviction.62
A defendant is criminally responsible for the acts of her companion and
may be convicted for murder when the evidence shows that she bound the
hands of the murder victims, had a gun ready to use, was present at the
home of the victims at the time of the murders, and later was arrested with
her co-defendant. 63 In LeDuc v. State64 the defendant requested a charge
on parties that included one on the "independent impulse" of her co-de-
from jury charge of means of causing death held not to be a denial of due process and not to
be fundamental error).
52. 593 S.W.2d at 725.
53. Daniel v. State, 585 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see Bullard v. State,
548 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
54. Daniel v. State, 585 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
55. See Exparte Colunga, 587 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
56. See Exparte Reynolds, 588 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
57. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
58. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
59. See Exparte Reynolds, 588 S.W.2d 900, 902-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparte
Colunga, 587 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
60. 587 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
61. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon 1974) provides:
In all prosecutions for murder or voluntary manslaughter, the state or the
defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing
between the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and
circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the
time of the offense.
62. 587 S.W.2d at 711.
63. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) states that an individual is re-
sponsible for the acts of another if he acts "with intent to promote or assist the commission
of the offense, [and in so doing] he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the
other person to commit the offense."
64. 593 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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fendant, who actually committed the offenses. 65 The defendant was in an-
other part of the house at that time. The trial court's refusal to grant the
requested charge was upheld by the court of criminal appeals. 66 The court
reasoned that such a denial was proper when the charge on parties that
was given fully protected the defendant.6
7
The mother of a child who died as the result of lack of medical care
entered a plea of guilty to the offense of murder, while the co-indictee, her
companion, was tried and convicted of the offense of injury to a child. In
Lang v. State68 the companion successfully argued fundamental error in
the indictment because the indictment for murder made no allegation that
the companion was a parent nor that the deceased was a child.69 By writ
the mother then questioned the same indictment as applied to her in Ex
parte Moss.70 When the omission is the conduct that is the basis of the
indictment, there must be allegations that the death was caused by failure
of the defendant to provide medical care, that the defendant was a parent,
and that the deceased was a child. Thus, the requested relief was denied to
Moss because the indictment met these requirements as to her.7' The dis-
position of Lang raises the question of the application of the law of parties,
for it is settled law that if the evidence supports a charge on the law of
parties, the court may charge on the law of parties even though the indict-
ment contains no such allegation. 72
B. Felony Murder
Few felony murder indictments73 are returned in Texas. Having been
convicted of felony murder, the petitioner by habeas corpus in Ex parte
Bailey74 convinced four members of the court of criminal appeals, who
dissented to the majority opinion denying relief, that his indictment was
65. The requested jury charge and the one submitted are quoted id. at 683-84. A dissent
was based on the trial court's failure to charge on circumstantial evidence, citing the dissent
in Coleman v. State, 530 S.W.2d 823, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing). 593 S.W.2d at 685 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
66. 593 S.W.2d at 684-85.
67. Id.
68. 586 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(l) (Vernon 1975) provides: "'Child' ... means a
person under 18 years of age who is not and has not been married or who has not had his
disabilities of minority removed .... " Id. § 11.01(3) defines "parent" as "the mother, a
man as to whom the child is legitimate, or an adoptive mother or father."
70. 598 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
71. Id. at 878.
72. See LeDuc v. State, 593 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
73. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides:
A person commits an offense if he:
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than voluntary or invol-
untary manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commis-
sion or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he
commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of an individual.
74. 600 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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defective for failure to allege a culpable mental state.75 Only those indict-
ments that fail to set forth an offense are fundamentally defective, how-
ever, according to the majority, and these may be challenged for the first
time in a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus.7 6 The court held that the
use of the word "attempt" in the indictment sufficed to supply the culpable
mental state because it included "intent. ' 77 The dissent pointed to the dif-
ferences in "attempt" cases and felony murder ones.78 In the former the
aim or desire of the defendant is an offense higher than the one committed;
in the latter, the aim or desire is an offense that is less than causing death,
but is one that, through the defendant's dangerous acts, escalates to mur-
der. The dissent urged that "to permit a failed desire to be the mens rea of
an offense that ordinarily is coupled with great malevolence is not [under-
standable]. '79 In the view of the dissent, a felony murder indictment
should allege the appropriate culpable mental state in relation to commis-
sion of acts that cause death.80
C. Voluntary Manslaughter
The trial court refused the requested jury charge on voluntary man-
slaughter after charging on self-defense in the murder case of Medlock v.
State .8 1 The evidence clearly raised the theory of voluntary manslaughter,
and the court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that the fact that the
evidence raised the issue of self-defense did not deprive the accused of the
right to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 82
A trial court may properly refuse to submit a charge to the jury on invol-
untary manslaughter,83 but only when the evidence does not raise the issue
of the defendant's having acted in a reckless manner in causing the death
of an individual. In Stewart v. State84 the court held that the testimony of
the defendant himself showed that he was acting in a manner that did not
show recklessness, the requisite culpable mental state of involuntary man-
75. Id. at 334 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
76. 600 S.W.2d at 332. The court also held that no claim of deprivation of adequate
notice can be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id.
77. Id.; see, e.g., Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 379-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
78. 600 S.W.2d at 332-34. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981) provides: "A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense,
he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the
commission of the offense intended."
79. 600 S.W.2d at 333.
80. Id. at 334.
81. 591 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also Roberts v. State, 590 S.W.2d
498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (trial court erred in not submitting requested charge on volun-
tary manslaughter when evidence fairly raised issue).
82. 591 S.W.2d at 487. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A
person commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual under circumstances that
would constitute murder under Section 19.02. . . except that he caused the death under the
immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause."
83. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) states that a person commits
an offense if "he recklessly causes the death of an individual."
84. 587 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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slaughter, and the trial court did not err by refusing to so charge the jury.85
In Simpkins v. State,86 however, the court reiterated the basic proposition
that when the facts raise the issue of criminally negligent homicide, a
charge must be given.87 Further, in another case,88 the court ruled that
when the evidence raises the issue, the trial court upon a proper request
must submit an instruction on criminal negligence as a lesser included of-
fense of involuntary manslaughter.89
Texas requires a jury charge on retreat if it is reasonable in the defend-
ant's situation, as well as on reasonable apprehension of danger, whether
real or apparent, as viewed from the defendant's standpoint.90 When the
trial court limits the jury charge on self-defense by a qualifying charge on
provoking the difficulty, the jury also must be charged that the accused's
right of self-defense would not necessarily be abridged by the fact that he
carried arms to the scene of the difficulty. The additional instruction is
necessary to ameliorate the limitation imposed upon his right of self-de-
fense by the charge on provoking the difficulty.91
III. BURGLARY
A. Indictment
Omitting an essential element of a burglary indictment creates funda-
mental error. The penal statute 92 requires an allegation that the defend-
ant's intent is to commit a felony or theft. 93 On the other hand, an
indictment for attempted burglary need not allege the constituent elements
of the underlying offense, that is whether a felony or a theft was at-
tempted.94
When the entry is completed and a felony is then attempted, the state
must properly allege the culpable mental state accompanying the entry. In
Watts v. State9" the indictment for burglary of a habitation and attempt to
85. Id. at 151.
86. 590 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
87. Id. at 133. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.07(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person
commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence."
88. Ormsby v. State, 600 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
89. Id. at 784-85.
90. See Valentine v. State, 587 S.W.2d 399, 401-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (Vernon 1974), which provides that except in certain prescribed situa-
tions, "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reason-
ably believes the force is immediately necessary toprotect himself against the other's use or
attempted use of unlawful force." See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (Vernon 1974)
(deadly force is justified if the actor would be so justified under § 9.31, and if he reasonably
believes the force is necessary to protect himself or to prevent the commission of certain
crimes).
91. See Gassett v. State, 587 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
92. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) provides that a person com-
mits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he "enters a habitation, or a
building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a
felony or theft."
93. See, e.g., Exparte Nixon, 571 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
94. See Prodon v. State, 555 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
95. 587 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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commit rape96 was found to be defective, and the court of criminal appeals
reaffirmed its 1978 Holcomb v. State97 decision. The court stated: "The
bald conclusory allegation that he entered the habitation and did 'attempt
to commit the felony of rape' is insufficient, as a matter of law, to charge a
crime."' 98 The court stated that an indictment for this offense must include
an allegation of a culpable mental state.99 As none was included in this
indictment, it was found to be fundamentally defective. °0
Noting that an indictment that is fatally defective is subject to collateral
attack, the court agreed with the defendant in Thomas v. State'0 1 and re-
versed the case.' 02 The defendant was convicted of burglary, and punish-
ment was enhanced by two prior convictions. 0 3 One of the prior
convictions was based upon a defective theft indictment, mandating rever-
sal of the punishment error. 104 Because a jury had assessed punishment,
the entire bifurcated trial, including the guilt-innocence phase, had to be
retried.105 When the court assesses the punishment, however, the case may
be reviewed as to the punishment alone. 10 6
B. Evidence
Applying the reasonable doubt standard in an attempted burglary case,
Solis v. State, 0 7 the court held the evidence insufficient to support the
conviction. After removing the screen from a window, the defendant ap-
parently abandoned the effort. Reasonable doubt existed as to his specific
criminal intent to commit burglary, an essential element of the attempt
statute. 0 8 Ironically, this same evidence satisfied the preponderance of the
evidence standard, thus permitting the trial judge to revoke the defendant's
probation. The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction for at-
tempted burglary and affirmed the revocation order. 0 9
Intent to commit theft may be presumed if the entry occurs at night-
96. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974) provides that a person com-
mits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he "enters a building or habita-
tion and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft."
97. 573 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
98. 587 S.W.2d at 160. But see Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (word "attempt" includes word "intent").
99. 587 S.W.2d at 161.
100. Id.
101. 589 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
102. Id. at 130.
103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974) provides:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previ-
ously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous
felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previ-
ous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by
confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.
104. 589 S.W.2d at 130.
105. Id.
106. See Girnus v. State, 595 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
107. 589 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
108. See note 78 supra for the text of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
109. 589 S.W.2d at 447.
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time.1 10 Relating to burglary, "night" means any time from thirty minutes
after sunset to thirty minutes before sunrise. I11 Rejecting the defendant's
argument in Alvarado v. State112 that there is a conffict between the pre-
sumption of innocence and the presumption of intent to commit theft if the
entry occurs at nighttime, the court stated that presumptions are not to be
given the weight of evidence; rather, stated the court, they are procedural
devices to determine which party must first produce evidence. 113
The burglary of vehicles statute 114 provides that any part of the body or
any physical object connected with the body will suffice for "entry." In
Simmons v. State"15 the defendant's "leaning into" the vehicle was suffi-
cient.116 Further, the court held that specific intent to commit theft may be
inferred from the circumstances in such a case.117
Two cases during the survey period were reversed, although both
reached the appellate court without transcription of the court reporters'
notes, bills of exceptions, or even briefs. 1 8 In examining the record the
court found fundamental error in these companion cases and in the inter-
est of justice reversed and remanded. 119 The jury charge in the joint trial
was silent on the law of parties. 120 It authorized the jurors to convict each
defendant for burglary if they found that his co-defendant was the guilty
party, without necessarily finding that such defendant must be guilty as a
party to the offense, or that he personally committed the offense. The
lower court, thus, had authorized conviction on a set of facts that would
not constitute an offense for which the accused was criminally responsible.
The convictions, therefore, were held fundamentally defective. 121
IV. ROBBERY
A. Indictment
For those lawyers who believed the old robbery laws of Texas were im-
mutable, the decisive break with tradition fostered by the robbery laws of
110. Id. at 446; Jones v. State, 587 S.W.2d 115, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
111. 589 S.W.2d at 446.
112. 596 S.W.2d 904, 905-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
113. Id. at 906.
114. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he breaks into or enters a vehicle or
any part of a vehicle with intent to commit any felony or theft." "'[E]nter' means to intrude:
(1) any part of the body . . . or (2) any physical object connected with the body." Id.
§ 30.04(b). Thus, the gist of the offense now is the entry, and it is not necessary to prove
breaking.
115. 590 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
116. Id. at 138.
117. Id.
118. Zuckerman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Zuckerman v. State,
591 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
119. By authority of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09, § 13 (Vernon 1979), the
court of criminal a ppeals reviews such records.
120. See note 63 supra for the text of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon
1974), the statute on party responsibility.
121. Zuckerman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Zuckerman v.
State, 591 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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the new Penal Code proved them wrong. 122 Because of the definition of
robbery, Texas has yet to see attempted robbery cases filed or final convic-
tions entered on that offense.' 23 It is clear that under the statutes, an ordi-
nary shoplifting case wherein the defendant struggles with a security guard
and causes any injury beyond the theft advances the offense to robbery. In
the event the guard is seriously injured, the charge elevates to aggravated
robbery. 124 If, however, a motion is made to quash the indictment for fail-
ure to allege by what means bodily injury was caused, it should be granted
if the indictment does so fail. In Cruise v. State 125 the indictment averred
that the defendant knowingly and intentionally caused bodily injury to the
complainant. Although the allegation of the manner and means of causing
bodily injury under section 29.02(a)(1) is not a fundamental requisite of
charging for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction, the court ruled that the
appellant's motion to quash entitled him to facts sufficient to bar a subse-
quent prosecution for the same offense and precise notice of the offense
with which he was charged. 26
In Honea v. State 27 the victim of the robbery died from suffocation
caused by inhalation of dust leading to aspiration of vomitus into his
lungs. He had been left bound and gagged on the floor of a barn. Appel-
lant contended that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and
the proof at trial: the indictment alleged the defendant caused "serious
bodily injury," whereas the victim had actually died. The court, however,
was not persuaded, observing that the physical conditions of the death
qualified as bodily injuries and were concurrent causes of the death. 28
Serious bodily injury is defined, in part, as "bodily injury that. . . causes
death." 129
B. Jury Instructions
Three uncommon defenses were raised in Montgomery v. State:130 du-
ress;13' entrapment; 32 and mistake of fact. 133 The defense showed that
122. See Butts, supra note 16, at 510-11.
123. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if, in the course of committing theft. . . and with intent to obtain or maintain con-
trol of the property, he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent
bodily injury or death."
124. Id. § 29.03(a) provides: "A person commits an offense if he commits robbery as
defined in Section 29.02 of this code, and he: (1) causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon."
125. 587 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
126. Id. at 405.
127. 585 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
128. Id. at 684.
129. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(34) (Vernon 1974).
130. 588 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
131. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent
death or serious bodily injury to himself or another.
(b) In a prosecution for an offense that does not constitute a felony, it is an
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during the robbery the defendant was acting under conditions that reason-
ably raised these issues. Although the trial court submitted the issues of
duress and entrapment in its charge to the jury, it did not instruct on the
defense of mistake of fact. This omission won a reversal for Montgomery.
The court stated that the evidence did raise the issue whether appellant,
through mistake, formed a reasonable belief that he was acting on instruc-
tions from a law enforcement officer, thus negating the culpability required
for aggravated robbery.' 34 As a result, the court stated that the jury should
have been charged on the issue, as the trial court is required to charge on
every defensive issue raised by the evidence.'
35
The jury instructions in Robinson v. State 136 omitted a word from one of
the elements of aggravated robbery.' 37 The omitted word was "immi-
nent." The en banc decision analyzed the charge as a whole, using the
factors from Cumbie v. State. 138 The court remarked that a jury charge is
fundamentally erroneous if it authorizes some diminution of the state's
burden of proof, or authorizes conviction for conduct that does not consti-
tute a criminal offense, or authorizes conviction for an offense of which the
accused has no notice.' 39 Finding that none of the Cumbie evils resulted
from the omission of "imminent" from the jury charge, the court affirmed
the conviction. 140
When the jury charge, however, clearly authorizes the jury to convict the
defendant under a theory that is not alleged in the indictment, as in Brown
v. State, 4 1 fundamental error exists. This error occurs when the instruc-
tions include that portion of the robbery statutes that is the basis for the
indictment allegations as well as another portion of the robbery statutes
not alleged in the indictment. Simliar consequences arise when the jury
charge adds a culpable mental state, such as recklessness, that is not al-
leged as a culpable mental state in the indictment. 42 The court will re-
affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was compelled to do so by force or threat of force.
132. Id. § 8.06(a) provides:
It is a defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the conduct charged
because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement agent using persuasion
or other means likely to cause persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute
entrapment.
See Langford v. State, 571 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (Texas statute provides for
"objective" test).
133. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "It is a defense to prose-
cution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his
mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense."
134. 588 S.W.2d at 953.
135. Id.
136. 596 S.W.2d 130, 131-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
137. See note 124 supra for the text of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
138. 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
139. 596 S.W.2d at 132.
140. Id. at 134.
141. 595 S.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
142. Hutchins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); accord, McNiel v.
State, 599 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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spond with a reversal to a complaint that the jury charge in an aggravated
robbery case contained an alternative theory by which the defendant
might be found guilty. The charge in Stone v. State 43 authorized convic-
tion if the jury found either that the defendant caused bodily injury, or
threatened or placed the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.
Only the latter allegation, threatening and placing in fear, was set out in
the indictment. 44
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has again illuminated its reason-
ing when this kind of error surfaces by way of habeas corpus rather than
by appeal. Exparte Coleman 145 raised a fundamental error question in a
case in which the jury charge set out the alternative theory of causing bod-
ily injury while the indictment alleged only threatening serious bodily in-
jury, as in Stone. Noting that error in instructions rarely rises to a
constitutional level,146 the court followed the test set out in Cupp v. Naugh-
ten: 147 "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial
that the resulting conviction violates due process."' 48
V. THEFT AND FORGERY
Two receiving and concealing cases fell when the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals determined that fundamental error existed in the indict-
ments.' 49 The governing theft statute' 50 mandates that the indictment
allege that the subject property had been stolen and, further, that it had
been stolen by another. These allegations were omitted in these cases,
causing reversal and dismissal of the indictments.15' Furthermore, if the
indictment contains a property description so vague as to constitute funda-
mental error, such as merely alleging "property" or "merchandise" of a
certain value, the defendant may raise this issue for the first time on ap-
peal. 152
Managerial authority over a department of a corporation confers "own-
ership" status for purposes of the theft statutes. 5 3 The court in Cross v.
143. 599 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). For an analysis of jury charge cases in
which the charge differs from the allegations of the indictment, see Sattiewhite v. State, 600
S.W.2d 277, 279-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
144. 599 S.W.2d at 831.
145. 599 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see Butts, supra note 16, at 495.
146. 599 S.W.2d at 306.
147. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
148. Id. at 147. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (setting forth the "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard of persuasion).
149. Beasley v. State, 599 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Shaddox v. State, 594
S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
150. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides: "A person
commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner
of property." Id. § 31.03(b) states: "Appropriation of property is unlawful if: . . . (2) the
property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another."
151. Beasley v. State, 599 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Shaddox v. State, 594
S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
152. Harris v. State, 587 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
153. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(24) (Vernon 1974) states: "'Owner' means a per-
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State154 said that a better practice is to allege ownership on behalf of
a corporation in a person acting for the corporation. An employee who
has responsibility over property or is in a managerial capacity is such an
"owner."1 55
Coplin v. State156 was a conviction for misapplication of fiduciary prop-
erty having a value of $10,000 or more. 157 The defendant was shown to
have received money from investors with which to obtain television rights
to a Mohammed Ali fight. He never obtained the rights, but he apparently
did use some of the cash. The court held that the language of section
32.45(a)(1)(B), "any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity," embraces
any fiduciary, including a joint adventurer or partner. l58
The defendant in Littlefield v. State, 59 while on probation, was leasing
an automobile in the name of Littlefield Enterprises Incorporated. No
payments were made on the lease before the auto was recovered as stolen.
The defendant's probation was revoked based on the theft of service stat-
ute. 160 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, stating that the
defendant had retained possession of the car for four months after being
placed on probation. 16' The court found that his failure to make lease
payments during that time constituted a theft of service, although the evi-
dence showed that the lease was made before he was placed on proba-
tion.' 62 Further, the court ruled that he properly could be held responsible
as a party to the offense.163
In Ex parte Kimberlin' 64 the state's motion for rehearing was granted,
and the court en banc reversed its earlier position in a case wherein the
court had questioned the requirement of a culpable mental state as an es-
sential element of credit card abuse.' 65 The indictment alleged that the
defendant fraudulently rented a car "with the knowledge that the card had
not been issued to him. . . and that said card was not used with the effec-
tive consent of the cardholder." 66 The court held that the culpable mental
son who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a
greater right to possession of the property than the actor."
154. 590 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
155. Id. at 511.
156. 585 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
157. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.45(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 1974) provides that "fiduciary"
includes any person acting in a fiduciary capacity.
158. 585 S.W.2d at 735.
159. 586 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
160. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides: "A per-
son commits theft of service if, with intent to avoid payment for service that he knows is
provided only for compensation: (1) he intentionally or knowingly secures performance of
the service by deception, threat, or false token .
161. 586 S.W.2d at 535.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 535-36.
164. 594 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
165. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.3 1(b)(1)(A) (Vernon 1974), which provides: "A
person commits an offense if. . .with intent to obtain property or service fraudulently, he
presents or uses a credit card with knowledge that. . . the card. . . has not been issued to
him and is not used with the effective consent of the cardholder .
166. 594 S.W.2d at 439.
19811
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
state of knowledge related to the allegation of lack of consent by the card-
holder. 67 In Baker v. State, 68 however, an indictment was not upheld
because the culpable mental state of knowledge was inserted at the end of
the allegations and did not relate to lack of effective consent. 169
Problems in the drafting of indictments for forgery' 70 lead to later rever-
sals because of fundamentally defective charging instruments. When the
forged writing purports to be the act of another, an essential element of the
offense will be that the other person did not authorize the act. Omission of
this element is fatal.' 71
VI. SEX OFFENSES
A. Indictment
Having established previously that a culpable mental state must be al-
leged and proved to support a conviction for attempted aggravated rape,172
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals scrutinized another attempted aggra-
vated rape indictment for fundamental error in Ex parte Prophet. 173 The
indictment alleged that the defendant "did then and there unlawfully with
intent to commit rape, attempt, by force and by threatening the imminent
infliction of serious bodily injury and death, to have sexual intercourse
with N S M, a female not his wife and without her consent." '74 The peti-
tioner failed in contending that the "intent to commit rape" as alleged did
not suffice to allege a culpable mental state. Although the court did con-
cede that it is better practice to allege the culpable mental state of the at-
tempted offense, it found that failure to allege the constituent elements of
the offense attempted is not a fundamental defect.' 75 The court stated,
however, that pleading the requisite specific intent is sufficient to allege a
culpable mental state where the gravamen of an offense is an act coupled
167. Id.
168. 593 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
169. Id. at 720; accord, Exparte Sharpe, 581 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see
Exparte Clark, 588 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
170. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i) (Vernon 1974) provides: "'Forge'
means. . . to alter, make, complete, execute, or authenticate any writing so that it purports
.to be the act of another who did 'not authorize that act .... "
171. See Lee v. State, 589 S.W.2d 710, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Morren v. State, 587
S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Kulhanek v. State, 587 S.W.2d 424, 425-26 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979).
172. See Zachery v. State, 552 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
173. 601 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
174. Id. at 373. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person
commits an offense if he has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife without the fe-
male's consent." Id. § 21.03(a) (Vernon 1974) provides:
A person commits an offense if he commits rape as defined in Section 21.02 of
this code . . . and he:
(1) causes serious bodily injury or attempts to cause death to the victim
or another in the course of the same criminal episode; or
(2) compels submission to the rape by threat of death, serious bodily
injury, or kidnapping to be imriiinently inflicted on anyone.
175. 601 S.W.2d at 374.
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with a specific intent.176
B. Jury Instructions
The jury charge in aggravated rape cases often causes reversible error.
If the jury charge authorizes conviction on a theory not alleged in the in-
dictment, the court will reverse the conviction, as was done in Scott v.
State.177 The indictment alleged that aggravated rape was committed by
compelling the prosecutrix to submit to sexual intercourse by a threat of
death to be imminently inflicted on her. In contrast, the jury was charged
to convict if the defendant compelled submission to the rape either by
threat of death or by threat of serious bodily injury to be imminently in-
flicted on her. The en banc holding was that this disparity constituted re-
versible fundamental error as it enlarged upon the allegations in the
indictment and permitted a conviction on facts not there alleged.178 The
dissent admonished that "[i]t is past time for this Court to turn away from
the automatic application of 'fundamental charge error' without the re-
quirement, in lieu of a proper objection, of a showing of harm to the appel-
lant . . . .179
An essential element of the offense of aggravated rape is the culpable
mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness. In a case in which the
indictment alleged that the defendant compelled submission by an immi-
nent threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, a jury charge
that fails to charge the essential element of a culpable mental state is fun-
damentally erroneous.' 80 Although the statutory language of section
21.03181 does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state
is required, and a jury charge that omits such an essential element is erro-
neous. 1
82
The defendant in Martinez v. State 8 3 was indicted for sexual abuse of a
child. 8 4 The jury, however, was charged not only in the words of the in-
dictment but also under another theory for conviction. By enlarging the
176. Id.
177. 599 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
178. Id. at 618.
179. Id. at 619-20; cf. Jackson v. State, 591 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (defend-
ant's conviction upheld because jury charge, although leaving much to be desired, was not
fundamentally defective). The five-to-four decision in Jackson affirming conviction brought
a strong dissent emphasizing that lay juries cannot assemble an instruction by choosing to
follow only the legally correct portions piecemeal and to ignore the incorrect. Id. at 825-26.
180. North v. State, 598 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
181. For the partial text of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.03 (Vernon 1974), see note 174
supra.
182. North v. State, 598 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); accord, Stidham v.
State, 590 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Banks v. State, 586 S.W.2d 518, 520
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
183. 599 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
184. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.04 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the other person's consent and
with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, the actor:
(1) engages in deviate sexual intercourse with the other person, not his
spouse, whether the other person is of the same or opposite sex. ...
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facts on which the jury might base its conviction, the appellate court ruled
that the trial court committed fundamental error. 185
C. Retrial and Double Jeopardy
In Martinez the jury originally found the defendant guilty of the lesser
included offense of indecency with a child. The questions then arise
whether the defendant may be tried for sexual abuse of a child upon the
reversal and remand and whether the Burks-Greene 186 reasoning precludes
retrial. Because this case is not an "insufficiency of the evidence" decision,
the Burks-Greene analysis would seem not applicable here. Nonetheless,
one could argue that the jury, in effect, acquitted the defendant of sexual
abuse of a child by finding him guilty of indecency with a child. Yet, the
court held that, under the facts of the instant case, indecency with a child
cannot be a lesser included offense of sexual abuse of a child. 187 Thus, the
defendant could properly be retried for the offense alleged in the indict-
ment. A different factual situation, however, might make indecency with a
child a lesser included offense of sexual abuse. In such a circumstance, the
question becomes whether a defendant, after conviction of the lesser in-
cluded offense, could be retried for sexual abuse of a child. The court of
criminal appeals may justify retrial in a jury charge case by distinguishing
this kind of error as one instigated by the trial court and thus not one that
denies a defendant due process of law and a fair trial as required by the
Texas and United States Constitutions. Some lawyers believe the court
may find acquittal of the higher offense.
Rucker v. State 8 8 illustrates the situation in which a retrial must be for
the lesser offense of rape because on review insufficient evidence was
found to support the conviction of the defendant for aggravated rape. The
jury's verdict on the element of aggravation can be upheld only if an im-
plied threat of death or serious bodily injury was communicated by the
defendant's acts and conduct. 189 The court of criminal appeals divided in
an en banc decision, and in dissent, Judge Clinton reviewed the history
and legislative purpose of Texas rape laws. The dissent noted that the
court "should consider the violence we do to the Penal Code's specified
intent and purpose that we construe it in such a way 'to prescribe penalties
that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses.' "190 The dissent
suggested that the jury must consider all of the happenings in the criminal
episode and not base its verdict on an isolated act or verbal threat to deter-
mine whether an aggravating factor occurred. 191 The plurality opinion
185. 599 S.W.2d at 624.
186. When the evidence is found to be insufficient to'sustain the conviction, the appellate
court will reverse the case and order an acquittal of the offense. Although the evidence fails
as to the highest offense, here sexual abuse of a child, a lesser included offense may some-
times be proved sufficiently. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
187. 599 S.W.2d at 624.
188. 599 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
189. Id. at 582.
190. Id. at 587.
191. Id. at 595.
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cited Rogers v. State, 92 which held that, absent an express verbal threat,
evidence was sufficient to prove the aggravating element only when a gun,
knife, or a deadly weapon was used or serious bodily injury was in fact
inflicted. 193 The Rucker opinion reaffirms the holding in Rogers.194
When the same assaulting acts are directed against one victim, no con-
viction for both aggravated rape and aggravated robbery can stand. The
court struck down the aggravated robbery conviction and affirmed the ag-
gravated rape conviction in Orosco v. State.195 Judge Douglas's dissent,
which traced the history of the Texas "carving doctrine,"' 196 noted that
carving is a court-made rule. 197 The dissent advocated a change in this
Texas approach to double jeopardy and suggested that the court, in deter-
mining whether prosecution should be barred for multiple offenses arising
out of the same transaction, should look to the definition of the offenses
and whether the results stemmed from single or multiple acts. 98 The dis-
sent listed as factors that should be considered the defendant's act or acts,
the intent for each act, and the different injuries incurred by the victim. 199
VII. ASSAULT OFFENSES
The Sixty-fifth Legislature enlarged criminal offenses by enacting signif-
icant additions to the assault statutes. Both the assault statute2°° and the
aggravated assault statute20 now contain the words "including his spouse"
to clarify who the recipient of the assault might be. When the assault vic-
tim is an educator engaged in the performance of educational duties, pun-
192. 575 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (a threat of future as opposed to imminent
harm will not suffice).
193. Id. at 559.
194. 599 S.W.2d at 586.
195. 590 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); accord, Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d
929, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
196. Carving is a court-made rule separate from TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14, which states
that "[n]o person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty ....
The state is allowed to "carve" out of a criminal transaction as large an offense as is desired,
but the state can carve only once. 590 S.W.2d at 125 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The state is
then bound by its election. Id. (citing Herera v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 607, 34 S.W. 943
(1896)).
197. 590 S.W.2d at 125.
198. Id. at 129.
199. Id.
200. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides: "A person
commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another, including his spouse; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with im-
minent bodily injury, including his spouse .
201. Id. § 22.02(a) provides:
A person commits an offense if he commits assault as defined in Section 22.01
of this code and he:
(1) causes serious bodily injury to another, including his spouse;
(2) causes bodily injury to a peace officer when he knows or has been
informed the person assaulted is a peace officer. ...
(3) causes bodily injury to a participant in a court proceeding when he




ishment is that for a class B misdemeanor. 20 2
If the defendant has knowledge that the victim is a peace officer, his
retaliatory action relating to an official duty performed by the officer forms
the basis for an aggravated assault charge. Any retaliatory or threatening
action performed against court personnel or court participants engaged in
prescribed court duty becomes an aggravated assault. These are third de-
gree felonies. 20 3 In addition, deadly assault2°4 on either a peace officer or a
court participant constitutes a first degree felony. The statute concerning
injury to a child 205 adds bodily injury as a felony of the third degree, un-
less the proscribed conduct was engaged in with the accompanying culpa-
ble mental state of recklessness or negligence, in which case it becomes a
class A misdemeanor. 20 6 When there is a terroristic threat207 that involves
violence to any person or to any property with intent to cause impairment
or interruption of public communications, public transportation, public
water, gas, or power supply, or other public service, this offense is a felony
of the third degree.
In Craig v. State208 the intoxicated defendant fought with police officers
202. See id. § 22.01(c)(2).
203. Id. § 22.02(a) provides:
A person commits an offense if he commits assault as defined in Section 22.01
of this code and he:
(2) causes bodily injury to a peace officer when he knows or has been
informed the person assaulted is a peace officer:
(A) while the peace officer is lawfully discharging an official duty; or
(B) in retaliation for or on account of the peace officer's exercise of
official power or performance of official duty as a peace officer; or
(3) causes bodily injury to a participant in a court proceeding when he
knows or has been informed the person assaulted is a participant in a court
proceeding:
(A) while the injured person is lawfully discharging an official duty;
or
(B) in retaliation for or on account of the injured person's having ex-
ercised an official power or performed an official duty as a participant in
a court proceeding ....
204. Id. § 22.03(a) provides:
A person commits an offense if, with a firearm or a prohibited weapon, he
intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury:
(1) to a peace officer where he knows or has been informed the person
assaulted is a peace officer ....
(2) to a participant in a court proceeding when he knows or has been
informed that the person assaulted is a participant in a court proceeding
205. Id. § 22.04 provides:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a
child who is 14 years of age or younger:
(I) serious bodily injury;
(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;
(3) disfigurement or deformity; or
(4) bodily injury.
206. Id. § 22.04(c).
207. Id. § 22.07(a) provides: "A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any
offense involving violence to any person or property .
208. 594 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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and was later convicted of aggravated assault. He argued that the arrest
was illegal, thereby giving him the right to resist it. The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that the illegality of the arrest does not establish that
the officer was not in the lawful discharge of his duty.209 Defendant fur-
ther contended that, while intoxicated, he was struck .on the head and
sprayed with mace before striking the officer. He argued that this pre-
vented him from forming the culpable mental state of intent necessary to
sustain a conviction. The court dismissed this argument as well, ruling
that the defendant had waived the issue because he had not raised it at
trial.210 Further, the court noted that "neither intoxication nor temporary
insanity of mind produced by the recent voluntary use of alcohol consti-
tutes a defense to the commission of a crime." 2
11
Texas law requires that the defendant have knowledge that the person
he assaults is a peace officer. 212 The court in Payne v. State 2 13 held that a
jury charge that permitted conviction if the jury found that the defendant
either knew or had been informed that the victim was a peace officer was
not fundamentally defective, although it authorized conviction on a theory
not alleged in the indictment. 214 Only the knowledge of the defendant had
been alleged in the indictment. In effect the court said that both personal
knowledge and informed knowledge connote knowledge under the assault
statute.215 A prudent trial judge should delete one or the other from the
jury charge, however, and follow the allegations of the indictment. Failure
to grant a motion to quash the indictment, although not urged herein,
could result in a reversal under similar facts.
In Guevara v. State216 the court established the elements of the offense of
resisting arrest.217 It held that knowledge is an element, along with
preventing the person known to be a peace officer from effecting an ar-
rest.218 The information in Guevara omitted an allegation that the defend-
ant prevented and obstructed a peace officer from making the arrest, but it
did allege that a peace officer was subjected to force from the defendant.
The court also concluded that force may be applied to someone other than
the officer effecting the arrest.219
The meaning of the words "a child who is 14 years of age or younger" in
the injury to a child statute220 presents an issue that continually divides
209. Id. at 94; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.3 1(b)(2), (c) (Vernon 1974).
210. 594 S.W.2d at 96.
211. Id; see, e.g., Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
212. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
213. 596 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
214. Id. at 913.
215. See id.
216. 585 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
217. Id. at 745; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03 (Vernon 1974).
218. 585 S.W.2d at 745.
219. Id. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03 (Vernon 1974) specifies that the force may be
used against "the peace officer or another."
220. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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courts. In Philps v. State22 1 the majority opinion held that the words
mean "all children who have not attained their fifteenth birthday. ' 222 Ob-
serving that the legislature could have used those words and did not, the
dissent believed that the statute applied only to a child who has not yet
passed his fourteenth birthday.22 3 The injured boy in the instant case was
over the age of fourteen but not yet fifteen.
The term "serious physical deficiency" employed in the statute wherein
the offense of injury to a child is defined 224 is not unconstitutionally vague
according to the court in Ahearn v. State.225 The court held that the par-
ents, indicted for recklessly and negligently engaging in conduct that
caused serious physical deficiency to their deceased child by failing to pro-
vide the minimum requirements of food and medical care that they were
legally obligated to do, may be correctly charged under this statute for
injury to a child.226
VIII. WEAPONS
The initial question raised in case law concerning weapons is that of
what constitutes a deadly weapon. This gray area of law provides the de-
fense with unlimited arguments in challenging whether a weapon is or is
not deadly. It has been established that a knife is not a deadly weapon per
se.227 In Denham v. State228 the court recognized that expert testimony is
not necessary for the prosecution to establish the deadly character of a
weapon. In Davidson v. State,229 however, the defendant faced an aggra-
vated robbery conviction for using a knife to threaten the complainant,
who was about five feet away from the defendant. The knife was not in-
troduced into evidence. The court ruled that even with proof of the size of
the knife, the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the defendant used
or intended to use the knife so as to inflict serious bodily injury.230 Such
intent is required by the aggravated robbery law.23 ' Nevertheless, the
221. 588 S.W.2d 378, 380-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); accord, Canada v. State, 589
S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
222. 588 S.W.2d at 380.
223. Id. at 382.
224. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.04(a)(1)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
225. 588 S.W.2d 327, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
226. Id. at 336. For an indictment to withstand scrutiny there must be allegations that
the death was caused by the defendant's failure to provide medical care, that the defendant
was a parent, and that the deceased was a child. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
Compare Exparle Moss, 598 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("for purposes of the
Family Code, to say that A is a parent of B is to say that B is a child") with Lang v. State,
586 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ("To say that 4 is a parent of B is not to say
that B is still a child.").
227. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(l 1) (Vernon 1974), which states:
"'Deadly weapon' means: (A) ... anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the
purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (B) anything that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."
228. 574 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
229. 602 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
230. Id. at 274.
231. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon 1974).
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court further held that although the evidence would not support a convic-
tion for aggravated robbery, it was sufficient for the lesser included offense
of robbery.232 The court affirmed an aggravated robbery conviction in
Dominique v. State,233 a case in which the prosecution had shown that
scissors held to the complainant's neck caused scratches, and that other
superficial cuts were inflicted on the complainant's hand and bicep. The
defendant was shown to have made slashing motions with the scissors, ac-
companied by a threat to kill. These actions were held to meet the deadly
weapon requirement of the aggravated robbery statute. 234
An earlier case raised the deadly weapon question and acted as a cata-
lyst in resolving the law. 235 Convicted again after his plea of guilty in the
same case, the defendant finds his second conviction similar to many
others in the Burks-Greene graveyard. The court of criminal appeals ap-
plied the rule of those cases retroactively, and the relief sought was
granted. 236
A firearm is per se a deadly weapon. 237 The defendant challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence in Wright v. State,238 pointing out that the
weapon was referred to as a "gun" or "revolver" or "pistol," but never as a
"firearm." The court held that testimony using any of the terms is suffi-
cient to authorize the jury to find that a deadly weapon was used.239 When
an assault is made with an antique firearm, as in an aggravated robbery,
the antique exception for possessory purposes is of no importance. The
antique firearm serves as a deadly weapon to elevate the offense to aggra-
vated robbery.240
Failure of the trial court to give a requested charge may reverse the
conviction for carrying an illegal knife.24' In Inzer v. State242 the defend-
ant, carrying a machete on the auto seat, was stopped for a traffic violation.
He testified that he was returning the machete to his home after his father
had borrowed it. The trial court had refused to instruct the jury to acquit
the defendant if it found that the defendant was carrying the machete di-
rectly home after lending it to a third person. The appellate court pointed
232. 602 S.W.2d at 274; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (Vernon 1974).
233. 598 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
234. Id; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
235. Alvarez v. State, 566 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The court ruled that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault based on the police
officer's testimony that the defendant swung a linoleum knife at him from a distance of three
or four feet. Id. at 612-13. The court held that the evidence regarding the manner of its use
or intended use failed to show that the knife was capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. Id. at 614. This opinion spotlighted the need for consistent decisions on what consti-
tutes a deadly weapon, and later cases settled the question.
236. Exparte Alvarez, 601 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
237. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(I 1)(A) (Vernon 1974).
238. 591 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); cf. Bugbee v. State, 593 S.W.2d 696,
697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (state failed to prove the length of a short-barrel firearm, result-
ing in reversal with court-ordered judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence).
239. 591 S.W.2d at 459.
240. See Vaughn v. State, 600 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
241. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974).
242. 601 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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out that there are certain statutory defenses243 to the offense of carrying a
weapon, as well as a number of judicially recognized ones.244 Because the
present Penal Code defense provisions reflect the law of Texas as it has
existed since the nineteenth century, the court of criminal appeals contin-
ues to recognize case law defenses that have had a continuing vitality since
that early time. Reasoning that the carrying of his machete under legiti-
mate circumstances was not an offense, the court held that the defendant
was entitled to the submission of this defense.245
The defendant in United States v. Elorduy246 contended that his convic-
tion for unlawfully carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony
must be reversed because the government failed to prove the essential ele-
ment of "unlawfully carrying. '247 The Fifth Circuit held that the govern-
ment was required to prove only that while the felony was in progress,
appellant was carrying a gun in violation of any firearms law. 248 Texas
law provides that carrying a gun is unlawful, 249 unless the person shows
that he came within one of the other statutory exceptions to the offense.250
As the defendant did not show an exception, the court ruled that the gov-
ernment met its burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit will thus look to the
laws of the state where the offense occurred should the government fail to
prove a federal violation in carrying a firearm. Proof may show a violation
of federal, state, or local "carrying laws" of the area.251 The facts in
Elorduy are silent as to whether the jury was apprised of the violation of
Texas law. An affirmative showing of the law should be required to sup-
port an "unlawful" finding, as this element of the offense cannot be as-
sumed by the factfinder.
IX. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Vicarious entrapment was the imaginative defense in Norman v.
State,252 a case involving the delivery of heroin. 253 The defendant never
was contacted directly by the government agent; rather, the contact was
made through a friend of a friend of her husband. This distance precluded
243. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides for exceptions
to prosecution such as traveling. These are not exclusive exceptions.
244. 601 S.W.2d at 368-69.
245. Id. at 369.
246. 612 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1980).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1976) provides, in part, that "[w]hoever ... carries a firearm
unlawfully during the commission of any felony ... shall ... be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years."
248. 612 F.2d at 990.
249. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02(a) (Vernon 1974) ("A person commits an offense if
he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about his person a handgun .
250. See id. § 46.03 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
251. 612 F.2d at 990.
252. 588 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
253. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.03(a) (Vernon 1976) states: "Except
as authorized by this Act, a person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentionally
manufactures, delivers or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled sub-
stance listed in Penalty Group 1, 2, 3, or 4." (Heroin is listed in Penalty Group 1.).
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her defense of entrapment. 254 The court focused on the conduct of the
government agents, rather than on whether the defendant was predisposed
to commit the offense or was otherwise innocent.255
The officer in 0guin v. State256 without question had probable cause to
stop an auto that pulled away from a stop sign without its lights on and
proceeded the wrong way on a one-way street. Upon approaching the car,
he smelled marihuana and thus had probable cause to search the car and
its occupants. A small quantity of marihuana was found in a plastic bag
under the passenger seat. The defendant, the driver of the car, was
charged with possession.25 7 The defendant was not the owner of the auto,
nor did he have any contraband on him. Further, the officer testified that
he did not see the defendant throw any marihuana under the seat. The
court found the evidence insufficient and remanded with instructions for a
judgment of acquittal. The court held that when the accused is not in ex-
clusive control of the place where the contraband is found, knowledge of
the contraband and control of it cannot be imputed to him unless addi-
tional independent facts and circumstances affirmatively link the accused
to the contraband. 258
The court in Scott v. State259 stated that an ultimate user 260 of a con-
trolled substance is not authorized to deliver this substance to anyone
other than members of his own household. 261 When the ultimate user de-
livers that controlled substance to a friend, however, the friend can prop-
erly be charged with possession, as in Scott, because the friend's conduct is
an offense against the laws of this state.262
Doctors and pharmacists appear more often now as defendants in deliv-
ery of controlled substances cases, as established in two notable cases de-
cided during the survey period, Santoscoy v. State263 and Merriman v.
State.264 The court en banc affirmed the conviction in Merriman and held
that the defendant's prescriptionless sale after hours in the defendant's
254. 588 S.W.2d at 346.
255. Id; see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), in which the majority sets
forth a subjective test that focuses on the predisposition of the defendant to commit the
offense rather than on the intolerable conduct of the police. See also Langford v. State, 571
S.W.2d 326, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (construes the Texas entrapment statute; panel deci-
sion that has not been overturned).
256. 601 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
257. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.05(a) (Vernon 1976) provides that "a
person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentionally possesses a usable quantity of
marihuana." Id. § 4.05(d) provides for an offense if the person "knowingly or intentionally
delivers marihuana."
258. 601 S.W.2d at 943; accord, Galvan v. State, 598 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980); Alexander v. State, 587 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence determined
insufficient to prove delivery to third person).
259. 600 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
260. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 1.02(26) (Vernon 1976) defines "ulti-
mate user" as "a person who has lawfully obtained and possesses a controlled substance for
his own use or for the use of a member of his household."
261. 600 S.W.2d at 802-03.
262. Id. at 803.
263. 596 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
264. 594 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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pharmacy of fifty dilaudid tablets containing a controlled substance consti-
tuted a delivery under the Controlled Substances Act and that the defend-
ant's status as a licensed pharmacist "practitioner" bestowed no immunity
upon him.265 At the time of the offense in Santoscoy, a medical practi-
tioner who was registered with the Department of Public Safety as re-
quired could not be convicted for delivery of a controlled substance merely
because he did not act in the course of professional practice.266 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the trial court's submission of a charge to that
effect required reversal of the defendant's conviction for delivery of con-
trolled substances. 267 The legislature recently enacted a penal law to make
an offense the prescribing, dispensing, or administering of a controlled
substance except for a valid medical purpose.268
The court of criminal appeals stated a new rule in Exparte Wilson 269 as
to charging instruments in both controlled substances and dangerous drug
cases.270 When the controlled substance or dangerous drug is not specifi-
cally named in a penalty group but is otherwise described in that group,
for example, an isomer of methamphetamine or a legend drug, such
description is an essential element of the offense and must be alleged in the
charging instrument in order to state an offense.271
Possession of a controlled substance may be a lesser included offense of
delivery. When possession can be proved by the same facts necessary to
establish delivery of cocaine, a conviction for possession of cocaine will be
held valid.272 Attempted violations of the Controlled Substance Act and
Dangerous Drug Act, however, are not offenses against the laws of
Texas.273
The Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Solis274 that because knowl-
edge, actual participation, and criminal intent are the necessary elements
of the crime of conspiracy, the government must prove each of these ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt.275 Recalling that the court had ban-
ished the slight evidence rule in United States v. Malatesta,276 the opinion
reemphasized that the verdict of a jury must be sustained if, after evaluat-
265. Id at 415.
266. 596 S.W.2d at 902 (citing Haney v. State, 544 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).
267. 596 S.W.2d at 902.
268. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 3.08(f) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
269. 588 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
270. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4476-14, -15 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1980-
1981).
271. 588 S.W.2d at 908-09.
272. See Jones v. State, 580 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
273. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(b) (Vernon 1974) provides that titles 1, 2, and 3 of
the Code apply to offenses defined elsewhere by other laws. The criminal attempt statute is
located in title 4; hence, the attempt statute does not apply to those other laws. But see TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.09(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) ("It is unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to acquire, obtain, or attempt to acquire or
obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception,
or subterfuge .... ").
274. 612 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1980).
275. Id. at 934.
276. 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1979).
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ing the government's case in a favorable light, there is substantial evidence
to support it.277 In the present case the evidence was insufficient and an
acquittal was ordered.278
X. ARSON
In Adrian v. State279 the only evidence presented by the state was the
defendant's confession that he had deliberately set the fire in question.280
The cause of the fire was never shown by other evidence. The court stated
that to establish the corpus delicti of arson the state must show that the
house was designedly set on fire by someone; even if the defendant con-
fesses, the extrajudicial confession alone is insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion.281 The court emphasized that the confession must be corroborated by
evidence that a crime has been committed, such as proof of the corpus
delicti. 282 Since the evidence was insufficient, the court ordered a reversal
and a judgment of acquittal. 283
The arson statute requires only that the defendant act with intent to
damage or destroy a building, and the act is complete when the defendant
starts a fire with the requisite culpable mental state.284 The co-defendants
in Romo v. State285 and Beltran v. State286 were convicted of arson, al-
though the Travis County jail contained noncombustible material, and ef-
forts to keep a fire going in their cellblock failed. In both cases the court
stated that whether damage of any kind actually occurs is irrelevant. 287
When bodily injury less than death is suffered by any person by reason
of the commission of arson, it becomes a first degree felony. Otherwise,
arson is a second degree felony.288 The defendant in Rinehart v. State289
prevailed in overturning his first degree arson conviction by contending
that the conviction was void because the person named in the indictment
died by reason of the fire. The court noted that if death results from the
arson, a different offense is committed. 290 A legislative amendment is ex-
pected to correct this incongruity.
277. 612 F.2d at 934.
278. Id.
279. 587 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
280. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 28.02(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provide: "A
person commits an offense if he starts a fire or causes an explosion . . . . [This] is a felony
of the second degree, unless any bodily injury less than death is suffered. . . in which event it
is a felony of the first degree." (Emphasis added.)
281. 587 S.W.2d at 735.
282. Id. at 734; see, e.g., Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
283. 587 S.W.2d at 735.
284. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
285. 593 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
286. 593 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
287. 593 S.W.2d at 693; 593 S.W.2d at 690.
288. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
289. 589 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
290. Id. at 443-44. The court lists three possible offenses: second degree felony arson;
murder; or capital murder. Id. at 444.
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XI. INTOXICATION
Intoxication results not only from the consumption of liquor but also
from the ingestion of drugs or any other substance that disturbs mental or
physical capacities of the body.29' The driving while intoxicated statute292
encompasses all situations where the driver is intoxicated, whether from
alcohol, narcotics, or other drugs. Although the Texas Penal Code closely
follows most of the Model Penal Code, there is a sharp departure concern-
ing intoxication. 293 The Model Penal Code allows intoxication as a de-
fense to a criminal charge if it is such as to negate a particular element
essential to conviction. 294 Texas retains its former law on intoxication, and
the Penal Code provides that voluntary intoxication is no defense to the
commission of a crime295 even if the accused was so incapacitated by his
intoxicated state at the time of the offense that he was unable to form an
intent. Thus, if the evidence shows proof of voluntary intoxication, the
jury will be instructed at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial that volun-
tary intoxication is no defense.
Another problem arises concerning the accused who claims to be invol-
untarily intoxicated. Texas law has been silent in reference to this ques-
tion. In Torres v. State296 the accused presented evidence that her friend
had drugged her drink without her knowledge. The defense asserted that
because of this involuntary intoxication she could not form an intent re-
quired to commit the crime of robbery. The court questioned whether the
defense of involuntary intoxication existed in Texas.297 In its answer, the
court created a new affirmative defense.298 The court held:
[I]nvoluntary intoxication is a defense to criminal culpability when it
291. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission
of crime.
(b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be intro-
duced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for
which he is being tried.
(c) When temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence
tends to show that such insanity was caused by intoxication, the court shall
charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(d) For purposes of this section "intoxication" means disturbance of
mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance
into the body.
292. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701/-I (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The driving
while intoxicated statute was amended by the 66th Legislature to include "beach." Id.
293. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon
1974).
294. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(l).
295. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 1974).
296. 585 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
297. Id. at 748.
298. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) An affirmative defense ... is so labeled by the phrase: "It is an af-
firmative defense to prosecution ..
(c) The issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is not submitted to
the jury unless evidence is admitted supporting the defense.
(d) If the issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is submitted to
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is shown that: (1) the accused has exercised no independent judgment
or volition in taking the intoxicant; and (2) as a result of his intoxica-
tion the accused did not know that his conduct was wrong or was
incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he
allegedly violated.299
The court reversed the case with the admonition that the jury should have
been charged on this defense raised by the evidence. 3°
The court's approach to involuntary intoxication in Torres parallels that
of temporary insanity produced by intoxication. As this latter affirmative
defense, which places the burden of proof of a preponderance of the evi-
dence on the defendant, is codified in section 8.01 of the Texas Penal
Code, the legislature may be expected to amend the intoxication statutes to
include the new involuntary intoxication defense. Raising an affirmative
defense at the guilt-innocence phase weighs somewhat heavier on the due
process scales than raising the issue at the punishment phase to effect miti-
gation of the penalty. The fundamental question is whether, in the face of
the plain language of the affirmative defense statute,30 1 the court, and not
the legislature, can create an uncodified affirmative defense, as it has done
in the instant case.
When one of the essential elements of an offense is voluntary intoxica-
tion, the legislature does not require proof of the culpable mental state of
the accused.302 Proof of a culpable mental state is not necessary when the
offense is driving while intoxicated.30 3 Nor does prosecution for involun-
tary manslaughter wherein voluntary intoxication is an essential ele-
ment304 require an allegation or proof of a culpable mental state.305 By
construing statutes to eliminate the culpable mental state requirement, the
court precludes the argument that the acts of the accused at the time of the
offense were not voluntary. This is significant in that Texas law is clear
that in order for a crime to be committed there must be a voluntary act as
the jury, the court shall charge that the defendant must prove the affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
299. 585 S.W.2d at 749; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the con-
duct charged, the actor, as a result of mental disease or defect, either did not
know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct
to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated.
300. 585 S.W.2d at 750.
301. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04 (Vernon 1974).
302. See Exparte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
303. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see, e.g., Owen
v. State, 525 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Exparte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1975).
304. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (Vernon 1974) states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he:
(2) by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an individual.
(b) "[I]ntoxication" means that the actor does not have the normal use of
his mental or physical faculties by reason of the voluntary introduction of any
substance into his body.
305. See Hardie v. State, 588 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
1981]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
well as a culpable mental state.3°6
XII. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
Upon the juvenile court's statutory transfer307 of the juvenile defendant
to the appropriate district court, that district court shall conduct an exam-
ining trial.308 In Menefee v. State309 the court announced that this proce-
dural step is mandatory and that failure to comply is a jurisdictional defect
that entitles the relator-juvenile to habeas corpus relief after conviction. 310
During the survey period two cases were decided granting juveniles post-
conviction relief.311
The court of criminal appeals emphasized in Criss v. State312 that waiver
of the examining trial by the child and his attorney may be proper if there
is strict compliance with the waiver statutes.313 When the record fails to
reflect such waiver and the state makes no affirmative showing of the ex-
amining trial, the court must remand the case to the district court for its
findings, even in a case in which the same judge presides over the juvenile
court and the district court.314 In Exparte Morgan3 15 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals was called upon to determine whether the former discre-
tionary transfer provision3 16 should be interpreted in the same manner that
the court interpreted the present provision 317 in Menefee.318 The court
306. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) states: "A person
commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission,
or possession." Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon 1974) provides: "'Conduct' means an act or omis-
sion and its accompanying mental state." Id. § 1.07(a)(1) provides: "'Act' means a bodily
movement, whether voluntary or involuntary, and includes speech." See Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 532-37 (1968) (conviction of defendant for public intoxication affirmed over
defense of chronic, involuntary alcoholism).
307. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (Vernon 1975).
308. Id. § 54.02(h).
309. 561 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
310. Id. at 829-30; accord, Simonton v. State, 586 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
311. Exparte Gilbert, 593 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Exparte Buchanan, 588
S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); cf. Guzman v. State, 589 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979) (post-conviction relief denied because record affirmatively reflected that examin-
ing trial did occur). See generally Butts, supra note 16, at 522-24.
312. 563 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
313. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears elsewhere . . . any right granted to a
child by this title or by the constitution or laws of this state or the United
States may be waived . . . if:
(1) the waiver is made by the child and the attorney for the child;
(2) the child and the attorney waiving the right are informed of and
understand the right and the possible consequences of waiving it;
(3) the waiver is voluntary; and
(4) the waiver is made in writing or in court proceedings that are re-
corded.
314. See Exparte Lantroop, 604 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hernandez v.
State, 603 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). But see id. at 849 (Daily, J., dissenting);
White v. State, 576 S.W.2d 843, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Davis, J., dissenting); Menefee
v. State, 561 S.W.2d at 830 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
315. 595 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
316. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 475, § 6(j), at 1084.
317. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h) (Vernon 1975).
318. Menefee v. State, 561 S.W.2d at 829-30.
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avoided reaching the merits of this question, ruling instead that petitioner
was outside the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.319 The defendant was
seventeen years old at the time he was arrested, indicted, and tried, and
under then article 2338-1, sections 3 and 5a,320 the juvenile court had no
jurisdiction because the male defendant was not a child. Thus, the court
reasoned that he could not be denied any rights under that article, such as
the right to an examining trial.32'
In Ex parte Trahan322 the court clarified the effect of the 1967 amend-
ment to article 2338-1, the prior juvenile law, which provided for a statu-
tory transfer and waiver of jurisdiction procedure as well as an examining
trial. No proceedings of any kind were conducted by a juvenile court in
Trahan. Instead, the juvenile was indicted when his age was sixteen and
pleaded guilty when he was seventeen. This was customary procedure
before the amendment. Under prior law, the age of the delinquent child
was determined at the time of the trial, not at the time of the commission
of the offense, as it is now. The court reasoned that had the legislature
intended that procedure to continue, it would not have amended article
2338-1 as it did.323 Thus, ruled the court, the indictment returned against
Trahan in 1968 conflicted with the terms of the juvenile statute as
amended in 1967.324 Because of the jurisdictional defect, the court granted
the writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the case.
325
In another jurisdiction case, Cordary v. State,326 the defendant entered a
plea of guilty to a felony and was given probation. At a subsequent revo-
cation hearing she proved her age to be sixteen at the time of her plea. The
court of criminal appeals declared the indictment void and dismissed the
case. 327 In its holding the court ruled that the provisions of the former
juvenile law328 and the present law329 define the age jurisdiction of the
319. 595 S.W.2d at 130.
320. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 475, §§ 3, 5(a), at 1082-83, construed in Exparte Trahan,
591 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
321. 595 S.W.2d at 130.
322. 591 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
323. Id. at 842.
324. Id. at 841.
325. Id. at 842.
326. 596 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
327. Id. at 891.
328. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 475, §§ 3, 5(a), at 1082-83.
329. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02 (Vernon 1975) states:
(1) "Child" means a person who is:
(A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age; or
(B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is
alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicat-
ing a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17
years of age.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
(b) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction and certifies the individ-
ual for criminal prosecution, a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted
of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age . ...
(c) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction and certifies the individ-
1981l
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
criminal court in substantially the same fashion.330
In efforts to curb the large number of applications for writs of habeas
corpus by juvenile defendants who earlier have been transferred and con-
victed in criminal court, the court in Ex parte Alexander33' limited the
holding in White v. State 332 to direct appeals. The Whfte holding, that the
record must affirmatively reflect that an examining trial has in fact been
held in the district court to which the juvenile is transferred will apply,
therefore, only to direct appeals, not to collateral attacks under article
11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.333 Thus, the defendant's burden
in a collateral attack is to prove the lack of an examining trial.334
The continuing Burks-Greene saga has emerged in the appellate civil
courts that review juvenile cases. In K. WH v. State,335 a case concerning
circumstantial evidence, the state failed to prove the commission of crimi-
nal mischief, the offense charged. The court of civil appeals ruled that
there was insufficient evidence concerning the matter and that the state
was prohibited from trying the juvenile again on this charge.336
One young defendant's attempt to cloak himself in the protective mantle
of the juvenile laws was refused by the court of criminal appeals. Shortly
before his seventeenth birthday the petitioner was adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent. After his seventeenth birthday he committed the offense of
aggravated robbery. The petitioner claimed that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to try him as an adult because he was still under the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court and that there had been no waiver of jurisdiction
under section 54.02.337 The court held that his favored status as a "child"
was not preserved by the adjudication; he could be prosecuted for a penal
offense committed after reaching seventeen and before becoming eight-
een.
338
Conforming the juvenile code provisions on accomplice testimony to
those in the Penal Code, a recent statutory amendment 339 was applied in
ual for criminal prosecution, a person who has been alleged in a petition for
an adjudication hearing to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct
indicating a need for supervision may not be prosecuted for or convicted of
any offense alleged in the juvenile court petition or any offense within the
knowledge of the juvenile court judge as evidenced by anything in the record
of the juvenile court proceedings.
330. 596 S.W.2d at 891.
331. 598 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
332. 576 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
333. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1980-1981).
334. See Exparte Lantroop, 604 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
335. 596 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
336. Id. at 251.
337. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (Vernon 1975).
338. Exparte Mercado, 590 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
339. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides in part: "An
adjudication of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision cannot be
had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to
connect the child with the alleged delinquent conduct .... "
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two cases during the survey period.340 In In re A.D.L C 341 the court
stressed that the juvenile amendment is identical to the corresponding arti-
cle of the Code of Criminal Procedure.342 According to the court, the test
to determine whether the accomplice testimony has been sufficiently cor-
roborated is first to eliminate the accomplice testimony from considera-
tion, then to examine the evidence of other witnesses, and if other
incriminating evidence tending to connect the accused minor to the com-
mission of the offense exists, that is sufficient corroboration. 343
XIII. CONCLUSION
Noteworthy signs continued to manifest themselves in the criminal law
field during the survey period. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals scru-
tinizes indictments and informations, both on direct appeal and on collat-
eral attack, for fundamental errors. It reverses, however, for fundamental
error only on direct appeal, when the error is found in a charge to the jury.
The exceptions to this approach are the rare instances when the jury
charge violates constitutional due process and denies the defendant a fair
trial. The court reviews for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
conviction and reverses and orders a judgment of acquittal if that is the
finding. Applications for writs of habeas corpus are granted to those con-
victed at a second prosecution following an earlier reversal for insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. From many years of decisions mandating a jury
charge on circumstantial evidence when that charge is properly requested,
the Texas court seems to be moving away from the rigid rule and toward
the close juxtaposition rationale. 344 Further, the criminal appellate court
is creating new law and construing much of the civil juvenile code.
340. In re M.L., 602 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); In re
A.D.L.C., 598 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
341. 598 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
342. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979), which states: "A con-
viction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other
evidence tendin& to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corrobora-
tion is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense."
343. 598 S.W.2d at 385.
344. See LeDuc v. State, 593 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Adams v. State,
588 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Ales v. State, 587 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979).
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